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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

LAWRENCE C. KAY ; JOY KAY;
ROBERT L . KAY; .and TERESA
KAY,

)
)
Case No. 870121

Plaint iffs--Appellants,

)

vs.
SUMMIT SYSTEMS, INC • , 6 u c l - L . ,
Defendants--Respondents.

/

)

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
On January 26, 1987, the lower court granted the
Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing each of the
counts of the Appellants' Complaint.

On March 16, 1987, the

lower court denied the Appellants' Motion for Order Vacating
Ruling and Granting Oral Argument.

Appellants are now only

appealing certain portions of the Ruling dismissing the various
causes of action in the Complaint.
This is an appeal as of right from that ruling.
Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
§78-2-2(3)(i).

This

ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Whether Appellants are bound by the factual record

presented to the lower court or whether they may, on appeal,
embellish that record by citing and misinterpreting testimony
not previously presented to the lower court.
2.

Whether a loan which was for the speculative

development of raw land and which three other banks refused to
make is unconscionable when it had an effective annual interest
rate of less than 25% and when it was fully secured by a trust
deed and letters of credit.
3.

Whether Appellants can reform the contracts on the

grounds of unconscionability when they accepted the benefits of
it, governed themselves according to its provision for over
eighteen months, and now bring suit to enforce it.
4.

Whether Appellants can reform the contracts on the

grounds of unconscionability when the contracts were
subsequently transferred to good faith purchasers.
5.

Whether Respondents were required to release

security when forced to resort to other security to collect
amounts due under the subject note.
6.

Whether Respondents are obligated to forfeit their

contractual rights and privileges in order to satisfy the
unilateral demands of the Appellants which seek actions and
concessions not required by the contracts.
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7.

Whether this State recognizes a cause of action

for tortious breach of an alleged implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing,
8. Whether an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing requires the Respondents to comply with additional
terms and demands unilaterally dictated by the Appellants after
the written contract has been executed and partially performed.
9.

Whether the lower court may consider (a) the

Appellants' own admissions that a dispute existed as to whether
any of the subject lots should be released under a subject
trust deed; (b) the additional record cited to the court; and
(c) common sense to determine whether the doctrines of
compromise, modification and/or of accord and satisfaction bar
the Appellants' claims.
10.

Whether Appellants can claim questions of fact

existed on the issues of compromise, modification and/or of
accord and satisfaction when they failed to cite any testimony
to the lower court refuting such a contention despite the fact
that the lower court specifically granted them an opportunity
to do so.
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Appellants (hereinafter "the Kays") filed their
Complaint on or about February 12, 1986.

(R.l to 16.) On

October 6, 1986, Respondents moved for summary judgment
dismissing the Complaint and filed a supporting memorandum, an
appendix containing the cited deposition testimony and the
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affidavit of Val E. Southwick.

(R.390 to 473.)

On or about

October 16, 1987, the Kays filed a responsive memorandum and
the affidavits of Lawrence Kay (R.498 to 506) and Robert L. Kay
(R.523 to 531.)

On or about October 29, 1987, Respondents

filed their Reply Memorandum in Support of the Motion for
Summary Judgment (R.555 to 568.)

On November 5, 1986, the

lower court conducted a hearing on a discovery matter.

During

that hearing, the Kays' counsel requested an opportunity to
submit an additional memorandum to the court regarding the
Motion for Summary Judgment.
(See R.1009 to 1012.)

The court granted that request.

No additional memorandum, affidavits or

record citations were provided by the Kays or their counsel.
On January 27, 1987, the Honorable Richard C. Davidson granted
the Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissed the Complaint.
On or about February 18, 1987, Appellants moved to vacate the
judgment (R.977.)

Because of Judge Davidson's assignment to

the Utah Court of Appeals, that motion was heard by the
Honorable Boyd Bunnell, who denied the Motion for Order
Vacating Ruling and Granting Oral Argument on March 18, 1987.
(R.1097.)
1987.

Appellants filed a Notice of Appeal on March 24,

(R.1101.)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This lawsuit is a result of the general decline of the

oil and gas industry and the deleterious effects of that
decline upon the economy of Vernal, Utah.

If that economy had

remained as robust as when the Kays began developing the Yellow

-4-

Hills subdivision (the property which is the subject of this
lawsuit), then the lots in the subject subdivision may have
sold, the obligations now owed to the respondent-assignees of
the subject Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note ("the Investors")
may have been paid according to the terms of the Trust Deed and
Trust Deed Note, and this lawsuit would never have been filed.
Unfortunately, the Vernal economy did not thrive, the
Kays did not sell lots, and they defaulted on their payment
obligations under the Note. When the Investors began pursuing
their contractual remedies, the Kays filed their Complaint to
delay the foreclosure of the Yellow Hills subdivision.
The Kays were successful in maintaining possession of
Yellow Hills without making any payments on the Note for over
eighteen months. On or about January 27, 1987, however, the
Honorable Richard C. Davidson granted the Respondents' Motion
for Summary Judgment and dismissed each of the purported claims
in the Complaint.

He did so after carefully considering the

memoranda of the parties and the record presented to him.

At

the Kays' counsel's request, Judge Davidson had even granted
them the opportunity to submit further evidence to him after
the normal briefing period, but they wholly failed to take
advantage of that opportunity.
On or about March 18, 1987, the Honorable Boyd Bunnell
rejected the Appellants1 arguments that the decision should be
reconsidered.
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The Kays now come to this Court claiming that Judge
Davidson and Judge Bunnell erred.

In making these arguments,

Appellants now rely upon testimony never presented to the lower
court, and they rely upon testimony which is inherently
illogical and refuted by their own testimony.

Based upon the

record before the lower court, and as a matter of law, the
lower courts properly dismissed the Appellants' Complaint.
They did so because the Kays defaulted on their contractual
obligations; those contractual obligations were valid and
enforceable; and the Respondents complied with all their
contractual, statutory and common law duties. Accordingly, the
decision of the lower court should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Contrary to the narrative contained in the Kays'
appellate brief, only the following facts were established
before the lower court:
1.

In January 1983, appellant Robert Kay purchased

the property encompassing the Yellow Hills subdivision for
$350,000.

(R.466.)
2.

The Kays subsequently applied for loans from First

Security Bank, First Interstate Bank and Zions Bank to develop
Yellow Hills into an improved subdivision, but all three banks
declined to loan funds to the Kays for that purpose.
3.

(R.429.)

In December 1983, the Kays applied for a

development loan from respondent Summit Systems, Inc.
("Summit").

(R.429; R.460.)

After negotiations, the Kays
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executed a Trust Deed Note for $806,000.

(See Exhibit A to

Complaint (R.l to 16), and Exh. B to Appellants' Brief).

To

secure the Trust Deed Note, the Kays executed a Trust Deed on
most of the Yellow Hills subdivision.

(See Exhibit B to

Complaint (R.l to 16), and Exh. C to Appellants' Brief).

Both

the Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note were signed by each of the
plaintiffs.
4.

(See R.438-439.)
At the closing, $667,000 was actually disbursed to

or for the benefit of the Kays.
R.448; R.475.)

(R.498 and R.523; R.436;

If the Kays had made all payments required

under the Note, they would have paid the equivalent of an
annual percentage rate of approximately 23.13% to 24.28% on the
funds disbursed.
5.

(R.476.)

Unlike typical loan transactions, Summit, as

lender, paid for all title abstracts, title insurance premiums,
recording fees, escrow closing fees, loan origination fees,
"points," and "finders fees."

The Kays were not required to

obtain additional "out-of-pocket" funds to close the loan.
(See R.476.)
6.

From January to May 1984, and for valuable

consideration, Summit assigned 100% of its interest in the
Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note to the investors who are named
as defendants in this lawsuit.

(R.477.)

The investors issued

a power of attorney to Summit to direct the trustee to execute
deeds of partial reconveyance as may be required pursuant to
the terms of the Trust Deed.

(R.477.)
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7.

The first quarterly payment under the Trust Deed

Note was due June 1, 1984. On or about June 19, 1984, the Kays
made a payment of $48,737.72.
8.

(See R.452; R.478.)

The Kays defaulted on their next quarterly payment

of $42,659.37 due September 1, 1984. Accordingly, on or about
October 2, 1984, the investors of the note called the letter of
credit from First Security Bank for $110,000.00.

(R.478.)

That letter of credit was drawn upon after discussions with
Robert Kay.

(R.457.)

The amounts received from the First

Security letter of credit were applied to outstanding interest,
penalties and principal.
9.

(R.478.)

The Kays defaulted on their next payment of

$42,659.37 due December 1, 1984. Accordingly, on or about
January 4, 1985, the holders drew upon the two letters of
credit from First Interstate Bank in the amount of
$170,000.00.

(R.478.)

That amount was applied to outstanding

interest, penalties and principal.
10.
1985.

The next payment of $42,659.37 was due March 1,

The Kays made the required payment of $44,792.34

(including late fees and interest) on or about March 28, 1985.
Id.

That amount was applied to outstanding interest, late

payment penalty and principal.
11.

(R.478.)

The Kays defaulted on the payment due June 1,

1985 in the amount of $42,659.37.
12.

(R.478.)

On or about June 2, 1985, the Kays wrote Summit

requesting release of seven lots.
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(See R.440; R.449.)

13.

On or about June 3, 1985, Clive Sprouse offered

to repurchase Yellow Hills from the Kays.

(See R.441; R.450.)

The Sprouse offer was conditioned upon seven lots being
released and other actions being accomplished by June 24,
1985.

(R.441; R.450.)

Kays.

(R.464.)
14.

The June 24 date was proposed by the

In response to requests from the Kays to reconvey

the seven lots, Mr. Southwick attempted to contact the trustee,
J. Scott Buehler, to authorize him to reconvey the seven lots
identified in the June 2, 1985 letter.
was out-of-town on vacation.
15.

Mr. Buehler, though,

(R.477; R.420.)

Mr. Southwick asked Vernal Abstract Company

("Vernal Abstract") to act as substitute trustee to accomplish
the reconveyance, but Vernal Abstract declined to act as
substitute trustee.
16.

(R.477.)

In late June 1985, Mr. Buehler returned from

vacation, and on July 1, 1985, he executed the Deed of
Reconveyance for the seven lots.
17.

(See R.478; R.489.)

The Kays failed to make the payment due June 1,

1985 and any further payments due under the Trust Deed Note.
Accordingly, as of July 23, 1985, the Kays owed the holders of
the note $621,378.71 in principal and accrued interest.
(R.478.)

Interest continued and continues to accrue on that

amount at the rate of $277.36 per day.
18.

(R.478.)

On or about July 29, 1985, Mr. Buehler filed a

Notice of Default with the County Recorder because of the Kays1
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failure to make the payments due under the Trust Deed Note.
(R.422.)
19.

The Kays filed their Complaint against the

defendants on or about March 25, 1986.
ARGUMENT
I.

Summary of the Argument

In January 1984, the Kays received $667,000.00 from
Summit Systems, Inc. which they used to pay off existing
obligations on the Yellow Hills subdivision and to further
develop that property into an improved subdivision.

The Kays

signed a Note secured by letters of credit and a trust deed in
favor of Summit Systems, Inc.
For valuable consideration, Summit Systems, Inc.
assigned 100% of its interests in the Note and Trust Deed to
the Investors who were named as defendants in this lawsuit.
The Kays made the first quarterly payment due under
the Note, acquiesced in the calling of the letters of credit
for the second and third quarterly payment, made the fourth
quarterly payment and defaulted on any subsequent payment.
Thus, they clearly accepted the benefits of their loan
transactions and ratified those contractual obligations.

Only

after the Kays encountered further financial difficulties did
they attempt to avoid those obligations by characterizing them
as "unconscionable."
As a matter of law, the Note and Trust Deed are not
"unconscionable."

The supposedly unconscionable substantive
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terms to which the Kays object are substantially less onerous
than other similar terms previously upheld by this Court.
Similarly, as a matter of law, there is no basis for a claim of
procedural unconscionability because no terms of the loan were
buried in fine print, and Summit was not responsible for the
Kays' perceived need to secure the loan.
Further, even if a claim for unconscionability could
have been made, that claim cannot be asserted against the
Investors who are bona fide purchasers/assignees of the Trust
Deed and Trust Deed Note.

Finally, the Kays have waived any

claim of unconscionability by ratifying the subject agreements
when they accepted the benefits of that loan, attempted to
comply with the loan provisions, and now seek enforcement of
that contract.
The Kays next contend that the Respondents failed to
comply with certain release/reconveyance provisions of the
Trust Deed.

The Kays admit that they defaulted on making

quarterly payments and that the Investors received payment by
resorting to the letters of credit which had been provided as
additional security for the loan obligations.

The Kays

contend, however, that the Investors were required not only to
lose any further interests in the letters of credit, but also
to voluntarily release their security interests in a
significant number of lots which had also been provided as
security.

The Kays' argument ignores the very purpose of the

Trust Deed and the letter of credit provisions in the Trust
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Deed.

That purpose was to provide Summit Systems, Inc. with

the level of security and collateralization for the repayment
of the loan which Summit Systems, Inc. deemed necessary to make
the loan.

The Kays ignore the clear language of the contract,

seek to render other provisions of the Trust Deed meaningless,
and ignore commercial reality.
As a matter of law, the Respondents met all (a)
express, implied, compromised and/or modified contractual
obligation; (b) all statutory obligations which, by law, were
incorporated into the contracts; and (c) all common law
duties.

Accordingly, the decision of the lower court

dismissing the Kays' Complaint should be affirmed.
II.

The Kays May Not Cite And Rely Upon Evidence
Which Was Never Presented To The Lower Court
And Which Respondents Were Never Allowed To
Address.

Pursuant to Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
Respondents moved for summary judgment to dismiss the claims in
the plaintiffs* Complaint.

The Motion was supported by

numerous citations to deposition testimony and the affidavit of
Val E. Southwick.
Pursuant to Rule 56(e), the Kays could not rest upon
the mere allegations or denials of their pleading.

They were

required to present affidavits and/or citations to other
testimony in the record which contained admissible evidence and
which raised issues of material fact.

If they did not so

respond, summary judgment, if appropriate was properly entered
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against them.

See Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development

Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1044-45 (Utah 1983) ("Franklin Financial");
Rainford v. Ryttinq, 22 Utah 2d 252, 451 P.2d 769, 770-71
(1969).
In their appellate brief, the Kays rely heavily upon
deposition testimony of the Kays and others which was never
presented to the lower court.

Consequently, the Respondents

were not allowed to cite additional deposition testimony or
submit additional affidavits to address the Kays' new
contentions.
In the court below, the Kays only relied upon (a) the
affidavits of Robert L. Kay (R.523 to 531) and Lawrence C. Kay
(R.498 to 506); and (b) the deposition testimony of Lawrence C.
Kay at p.90, line 14 to p.91, line 23, and of Robert L. Kay
p.35, line 9 to p. 37, line 10. This was done despite the fact
Judge Davidson gave them an opportunity to present additional
evidence.

It is improper for the Kays to now attempt to

embellish the record and present new evidence for the first
time on appeal.

See Cowan & Co. v. Atlas Stock Transfer Co.,

695 P.2d 109, 113-14 (Utah 1984); Franklin Financial, 659 P.2d
at 1045.
Accordingly, the Kays' contentions on appeal will be
argued based upon the record before the lower court.
III.

The Kays Breached Their Contractual Obligations.

Pursuant to the terms of the Note, commencing June 1,
1984, the Kays were obligated to make guarterly payments of at
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least $42,659.37.

From their own funds, they only made the

June 1984 and May 1985 payments.

As a result of the Kays'

failure to make the quarterly payments due September 1, 1984
and December 1, 1984, three letters of credit were drawn upon
as provided in the Trust Deed.
since May 1985.

No payments have been made

Thus, the Kays have clearly breached their

contractual obligations.
The only question presented on this appeal is whether
the Kays have a legal excuse for those breaches. As set forth
below, the Kays have no valid grounds for avoiding their
contractual obligations.
IV.

The Trust Deed And Trust Deed Note Are Not
Unconscionable. Accordingly, The Lower Court
Correctly Ruled That The Subject Agreements
Are Valid And Enforceable.

Count I of the Kays' Complaint sought reformation of
the Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note to make them more "fair,
reasonable, conscionable and enforceable."

(R.10.)

In answers

to interrogatories (R.345-352) the Kays objected to the
substantive terms of the agreements which provided for a
"discount" of $139,000.00 and required them to obtain letters
of credit as additional security for repayment of the funds
which they received.

They also contend that the agreements

were procedurally unconscionable because they were in financial
distress and were thus forced to accept onerous terms which
differed from those which they thought would be included.
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A,

As a Matter of Law, the Substantive
Terms of the Agreements Are "Conscionable".

It is well-settled that in the absence of compelling
considerations of policy to the contrary, it is the duty of the
courts to give effect to the covenants to which the parties
have agreed in their contracts.

Lundstrom v. Radio Corporation

of America, 17 Utah 2d 114, 405 P.2d 339, 341 (1965).

M

A court

does not have carte blanche to reform any transaction to
include terms that it believes are fair."

Briggs v. Liddell,

699 P.2d 770, 772 (Utah 1985); Cunningham v. Cunningham, 690
P.2d 549, 550 (Utah 1984).

See also Bekins Bar V Ranch v.

Huth, 664 P.2d 455, 459 (Utah 1983); Carlson v. Hamilton, 8
Utah 2d 272, 332 P.2d 989, 990-91 (Utah 1958); Ephraim Theatre
Co. v. Hawk, 7 Utah 2d 163, 321 P.2d 221, 223 (Utah 1958);
Tooele City v. Settlement Canyon Irrigation Co., 4 Utah 2d 215,
291 P.2d 881, 883 (Utah 1955).
The case of Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth, 664 P.2d 455
(Utah 1983) ("Bekins Bar") is directly on point and
demonstrates, as a matter of law, that the Kays' agreement with
Summit is not unconscionable.

In that case, the plaintiff,

Bekins Bar V Ranch, was in desperate financial condition.

To

meet its financial obligations, the Ranch's president and his
wife ("the Fains") borrowed $120,000.00 from the defendant
Huths.

664 P.2d at 457.

They agreed to repay $200,000.00 in

annual installments of $100,000.00, $50,000.00, and
$50,000.00.

1A.

That was the eguivalent of an annual interest

rate of 36.3 per cent.

Id.

The Fains later took out a second
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loan for $80,000.00 from the Huths and agreed to repay
$100,000.00 within six months —
rate of 5j^ percent!

Id.

an effective annual interest

The loans to the Fains were secured

by a second .and third trust deed on the Fains* ranch, a
security interest in farm equipment, three years of hay crops,
and other personal property.

Id.

When the Fains defaulted on the payment of the loans,
the Huths began foreclosure proceedings.

The Fains sought

preliminary injunctive relief, and, as have the Kays, claimed
that they were not in default, that the notice of default had
been improperly filed, and that the loans were "unconscionable.M
The trial court agreed with the Fains and attempted to
substantially modify the terms of the agreement.

See 664 P.2d

at 458-459.
The Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court and
found that the trial court's attempts to make the agreements
more "fair" were improper.

It also ordered that the loan

agreements be enforced as written.

In doing so, the court made

a number of observations which are pertinent to this case.
First, the determination of whether a contract is
unconscionable is to be made with respect to the conditions
which existed at the time the contract was made.

See 664 P.2d

at 461.
Second, the court noted that:
The availability of high risk capital is
essential to the functioning of our economic
system. New enterprises with untested
products often require high cost capital, as
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do ventures whose viability is uncertain for
whatever reason. Bekins argues that the
finance charges on the loans, amounting to
36.3 percent on the $200,000 loan and 58
percent on the $100,000 loan, and the
security taken for the loans, were
excessive. Although the finance charges are
high by some standards, we do not think they
were unconscionable . . . . Huths•
subsequent loans to Bekins, which proved
necessary because of obvious underfinancing
of the ranch operation, were clearly high
risk. Acquisition of high risk capital
almost always requires the payment of a
premium. It is not sound legal policy to
establish rules so strict as to
unnecessarily dampen legitimate and
desirable business activity.
664 P.2d at 463.
There is no doubt that the Kays agreed to pay a
relatively high rate of interest for the money they obtained
from Summit.

The undisputed evidence demonstrated, however,

that the Kays received a loan of $667,000.00 for a venture for
which three different banks were unwilling to provide funds.
They were able to obtain their high-risk venture loan with a
longer repayment schedule than the banks would normally allow.
They were not required to come up with loan origination fees,
title reports, title insurance, or other out-of-pocket costs to
obtain the loan.
The Kays agreed to pay back their loan at an
equivalent effective annual interest rate of approximately
24.28%.

That interest rate was much lower rate than the 36.3%

and 58% interest rates held to be proper and enforceable in the
two "discounted" loans in Bekins Bar.

Thus, under Utah law,

under circumstances analogous to the case at bar, the amount of
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the "discount" to the plaintiffs and their agreement to repay
the funded amounts with an annual effective interest rate less
than 25% is not unconscionable.
The Kays also claim it was unconscionable for Summit
Systems to require them to provide letters of credit as
security.l

Not surprisingly, plaintiffs cite no authority

for the novel contention that it is unconscionable for a lender
to seek additional collateral for its loan.

Indeed, in Bekins

Bar the lender obtained security interests in hay crops, the
debtors' properties, and several other items.

In light of (a)

the Kays' failure to make the September 1, 1984, December 1,
1984, and June 1, 1985 payments, (b) the generally depressed
state of the Vernal economy, and (c) the inherent risk
associated with developing raw land into improved subdivision
lots, Summit Systems was more than justified in seeking such
additional security.

x

The primary basis of this claim is that the loan was already
fully collateralized since the property itself had an appraised
value of $1,518,000.00. This perfectly illustrates how
Respondents are prejudiced by Appellants' delinquent citation
to deposition testimony never presented to the lower court. In
fact, the appraisal which the Kays relied upon estimated the
market value of fully improved lots. On its face, it did not
reflect the value of the property at the time the loan was made
to the Kays and the property was undeveloped.
Similar arguments could be made regarding each of the Kays
new factual assertions, e.g., they contend that Summit delayed
the loan closing for several months, but the loan documents on
their face, show that the letters of credit were not provided
until less than two weeks before the closing.

-18-

B.

There Are No Procedural Considerations
Rendering the Subject Transactions
Unconscionable.

The Kays contend that the subject loan transaction was
procedurally unconscionable because by the time the loan was
closed, the Kays were in such desperate financial straits that
they were forced to accept the unconscionable substantive
terms. As a matter of law, this claim is without merit.
To sustain a claim of "duress" or "compulsion," it
must be proven that the Respondents wrongfully created the
economic circumstances forcing the Kays to borrow funds from
Summit. When a contract is otherwise entered into under stress
of pecuniary necessity, it is not "compulsion."

See Clearwater

Constr. & Eng'r, Inc. v. Wickes Forest Indus., 108 Idaho 132,
697 P.2d 1146, 1148-49 (1985) ("Clearwater"); Continental
Illinois National Bank & Trusts Co. of Chicago v. Stanley, 60 6
F.Supp. 558, 562 (N.D.I11. 1985); Sheraton Hawaii Corp. v.
Poston, 454 P.2d 369, 372 (Haw. 1969); Chouinard v. Chouinard,
568 F.2d 430, 433-34 (5th Cir. 1978).
The Kays found themselves in their alleged economic
predicament from their own actions.

The Respondents did not

require the Kays to purchase and develop Yellow Hills. The
Respondents did not force the three banks to turn down the
Kays' loan requests. The Respondents did not prevent the Kays
from negotiating with other lenders about obtaining development
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loans at the same time they were negotiating with Summit
Systems, Inc.
$667,000.00.

The Respondents did not force the Kays to take
The Respondents did not prevent the Kays from

seeking refinancing at more favorable terms at any time from
another lender after the loan was entered into. As a matter of
law, therefore, the supposed fact that the Kays were required
to accept the financing because of their own economic situation
is not grounds for reforming the contract on the grounds of
unconscionability.
Similarly, there are no other grounds for claiming
"procedural" unconscionability.

Usually, such a claim is based

upon onerous terms being buried in "fine print."

See

Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch and Livestock Company,
Inc., 706 P.2d 1028, 1042 (Utah 1985).
objected to were not buried.

In this case, the terms

They were specifically set out in

a separate typewritten documents —

Schedule A to the Trust

Deed and a closing statement showing the amount of the
discount.

It is undisputed that the Kays reviewed the loan

documents at closing, and although they now claim those terms
differed from alleged prior oral negotiations, they signed
those loan documents knowing the amount they would be obligated
to repay.

Further, it is undisputed that no one prevented the

Kays from seeking the advice of counsel or delaying the closing
for a short period if they felt that was necessary.
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Based upon the foregoing, the subject agreements were
not procedurally or substantively unconscionable, and, thus,
Count I of the Complaint was properly dismissed.
C.

The Kays May Not Reform The Contracts
Because They Have Accepted The Benefits
Of The Loan And Have Ratified It.

Even assuming arguendo that the subject loan
transaction was "unconscionable," such would make the contract
"voidable," not void.

See Clearwater, 697 P.2d at 1149;

Hubbard v. Geare, 77 Ariz. 262, 269 P.2d 1064, 1065-66 (1954);
State v. Barlow, 153 P.2d 647, 654 (Utah 1944).
can be adopted and ratified.

Such contracts

An unconscionable contract is

ratified when the party accepts the benefits of that contract
and/or complies with its provisions.

Id.

The Kays accepted the benefits of the loan, i.e., they
received $667,000.00.

The Kays made at least two of four

quarterly payments before defaulting or failing to make any
further payments. They were consulted with and cooperated in
the calling of the letters of credit as provided in the Trust
Deed.

They are now seeking enforcement of certain provisions

of the Trust Deed which they claim the Respondents breached.
They may not both seek to reform the contract and seek damages
for its alleged breach.

See Burley Newspapers, Inc. v. Mist.

Publishing Co., 414 P.2d 460, 462-63 (Idaho 1966).

Thus, the

Kays have adopted the contract and ratified it. They are no
longer entitled to reformation of the Trust Deed and Note on
the grounds of unconscionability.
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D.

The Trust Deed And Note Cannot Be
Reformed Because They Are Held By
Bona Fide Purchasers.

Even assuming arguendo that the Kays were entitled to
reformation and that they had not ratified the contract, the
Kays may not seek reformation against the Investors who
collectively now hold 100% of the Trust Deed and Note.
Contracts may not be reformed against good faith purchasers.
See, e.g., Beams v. Werth, 200 Kan. 532, 438 P.2d 957, 967
(1968), cited with approval in Hottinger v. Jensen, 684 P.2d
1271, 1273 (Utah 1984).

It is undisputed that the Investors

are bona fide, good faith purchasers who paid valuable
consideration to acquire their interests in the Trust Deed and
Note.
V.

The Respondents Were Under No Obligation To
Release Lots When The Kays Had Defaulted On
The Repayment Obligations, And The Respondents
Were Forced To Seek Payment From Additional
Security.

The Kays1 second major contention is that the
Respondents breached an express and implied contractual duty to
reconvey lots from the Trust Deed when the principal amount of
the loan was reduced by calling the letters of credit.

This

contention is without merit.
The Kays agreed to repay $806,000, plus interest over
the three year period of the loan.
collateralize that loan.

They agreed to fully

To secure the loan, the Kays executed

a Trust Deed on the Yellow Hills property.

Ass additional

security, the Kays provided three letters of credit in the
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aggregate amount of $280,000 which could be called pursuant to
the terms of paragraph 23 of the Trust Deed:
23. Letter(s) of Credit. AJS additional
security for the indebtedness the Trustor
has delivered or shall deliver to the
beneficiary the following irrevocable and
unconditional letter(s) of credit drawn for
the Trustor's account.
Bank: First Security Bank of Utah, N.A.
("The first bank")
Letter of Credit Number: 062-060-8980-50005
Amount: $110,000.00
Expiration Date: July 10th 1985
Bank: First Interstate Bank
("The second bank")
Letter of Credit Number: 2003 and 2004
Amount: $130,000.00 (#2003) & $40,000.00
(#2004)
Expiration Date: Both July 10th 1985
The beneficiary shall have the right to draw
upon the letter(s) of credit or any renewal
or extension thereof, in whole or in part,
upon the occurrence of any one or more of
the following events:
(A)l. the occurrence of any event of
default under this mortgage;
(B) Proceeds of any draw upon the
letter(s) of credit may be applied by the
beneficiary to be a payment of accrued
interest (including any accrued interest the
payment of which was otherwise deferred),
late charges, principal (including any
pre-payment charge occasioned by a principal
payment), or any other obligation arising
out of the Trustor's obligation to the
beneficiary under this Deed of Trust or the
Trust Deed Note, in such manner as the
beneficiary, in its sole discretion, deems
appropriate.
(C) Provided there is no default . . .
the beneficiary shall release its rights in
the letter(s) of credit and surrender the
letter(s) of credit to the first and second
bank upon the principal reduction of the
Trust Deed Note as secured by this Deed of
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Trust in the amount of Two Hundred Eighty
Thousand ($280,000,00) Dollars.
(Emphasis added.)
Paragraph 23(C) expresses the parties* intent that
security for the loan would be released when the principal
balance had been reduced by $280,000.00. At that point, the
$280,000.00 of letters of credit would be released as security,
and the Investors would look solely to the property for
security for remaining amounts due under the Note.
The Kays' contention that the Investors were obligated
to release their security interests in twelve lots when the
Kays defaulted and the letters of credit drawn upon is
purportedly based upon paragraph 22 of the Trust Deed.
Paragraph 22 of the Trust Deed authorized partial
releases of the Trust Deed if and when the Kays met their
contractual obligations by making the required quarterly
payments:
22o Partial Releases. Upon receipt of the
written request of the Trustor, and upon
receipt of the principal payments
hereinafter set forth, the beneficiary shall
instruct the Trustee to deliver to the
Trustor Deeds of Partial Reconveyance as
follows:
(a) Plat "A": Lots 1 through 27 excluding
Lots 10, 20, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33,
and 34 upon receipt of $15,000.00 for
each lot to be so reconveyed.
(b) Plat -A": Lots 35 through 95 upon
receipt of $13,000.00 principal for
each lot to be so reconveyed.
(c) Plat "B": Lots 1 through 51 upon
receipt of $5,000.00 principal for each
lot to be so reconveyed.
(Emphasis added.)

-24-

It is axiomatic that when interpreting a contract, the
court must consider each of its provisions in connection with
the others and with a view towards the circumstances, nature
and purpose of the transaction.

Effect is to be given the

entire agreement without ignoring any part thereof.

See Jones

v. Hinkle, 611 P.2d 733, 735 (Utah 1980); Utah State Medical
Ass'n v. Utah State Employees Credit Union, 655 P.2d 643, 646
(Utah 1982); Larrabee v. Royal Dairy Products Co., 614 P.2d
160, 163 (Utah 1980).

Accordingly, paragraphs 22 and 23 must

be read together in light of the nature of the transaction and
the purpose of the Trust Deed and letters of credit which was
to provide security for the loan.
The Kays1 contention that they were entitled to lot
releases when the letters of credit were drawn is clearly
contrary to the intents and purposes of the Trust Deed
provisions and is inherently illogical.

The following

hypothetical example illustrates this point:
Borrower desires to develop 50 lots into
an improved subdivision. He needs to borrow
$100,000 to do so. The current appraised
value of the lots are $1,000 each, $50,000
total. Lender is willing to make a $100,000
loan provided that Borrower secures the loan
with the property as well as two letters of
credit, one for $30,000 and one for
$20,000. Thus, the $100,000 loan will be
fully collateralized. Lender also agrees to
release one lot for each $2,000 principal
received. By the time Borrower pays
$100,000, all the lots will be released.
This is a typical loan arrangement.
Borrower fails to make the first payment
due on the loan so that the $30,000 letter
of credit is drawn upon. Under the Kays1
theory, the $30,000 should be credited to
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principal leaving a balance of $70,000,
They also contend that 15 lots should be
released because the principal balance has
been reduced. Thus, the remaining
collateral would be 35 lots at $1,000 each
and one $20,000 letter of credit. Instead
of being fully collateralized, Lender is now
owed $70,000, but now only has $55,000 worth
of security (i.e., the $20,000 letter of
credit and $35,000 in property).
If Borrower missed the next payment so
that the second $20,000 letter of credit was
drawn upon, under the Kays' theory, an
additional 10 lots should be released.
Lender would now be owed $50,000, yet would
only have a security interest in 25 lots for
$25,000. This contention is inherently
untenable and contrary to sound lending
practices.
While the Kay/Summit transaction is more complex than
the illustration above, the principal is the same.

The release

provisions in the subject trust deed, read together with the
letter of credit provisions establish that the parties intended
that lots would be released when principal payments were
received in. the normal course, not when received by resorting
to other collateral.

This is the only interpretation which

makes commercial sense.

Indeed, under the Kays* theory, the

letters of credit would not be "additional security," but would
be a principal source of payment.

Under the Kays' theory

paragraph 23(C) of the Trust Deed would be rendered
meaningless, because security would be released before the Kays
had reduced the principal balance of the loan by $280,000.00.
The Kays argue that ambiguous contract provisions
should be construed against the drafter.

While that

proposition of law is generally true, simply because parties
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interpret language differently does not mean the contract is
ambiguous.

See Camp v. Deseret Mutual Benefit Ass'n, 589 P.2d

780, 782 (Utah 1979).

Where, as here, the provisions of the

contract can be reconciled to give effect to all those
provisions, there is no ambiguity.

See Camp v. Deseret Mutual

Benefit Ass'n, 589 P.2d 780, 782 (Utah 1979); Steel v. Eagle,
207 Kan. 146, 483 P.2d 1063, 1066 (1971).

As demonstrated

above, paragraphs 22 and 23 can only be harmonized if
interpreted to require lot releases if the principal balance
was reduced by payments on the loan itself, not by collection
of funds from additional security.
The Kays cite deposition testimony wherein they
contend Summit Systems, Inc. had agreed to release lots if
letters of credit were drawn upon.

That deposition testimony

is inherently equivocal, and even if it were not, it would be
inadmissible parol evidence which seeks to alter the terms of
the written contract.

See Rainford v. Rytting, 22 Utah 2d 252,

451 P.2d 769, 771 (1969); Steel v. Eagle, 207 Kan. 146, 483
P.2d 1063, 1066 (1971).
Based upon the foregoing, a construction of the
agreement as a whole, in light of its purposes, and in order to
give effect to all its provisions, indicates that the Kays were
not entitled to any lot releases when the letters of credit
were drawn upon.

It would be error for this Court to rule

otherwise.
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VI.

Respondents Complied With Their Contractual
And Statutory Obligations In Reconveying Lots
To The Kays.

Although the Kays were not entitled to any lot
releases under the Trust Deed when the letters of credit were
called, Summit later agreed to release seven lots in order to
facilitate the sale of the entire Yellow Hills subdivision to a
third party.

Indeed, such a sale would have been highly

advantageous to Respondents because it would have triggered the
due-on-sale clause of the Trust Deed (1fl4a) and provided for
repayment of the loan.
The Kays0 contention that the Respondents were
obligated to reconvey the seven lots by June 24, 1985, however,
is wholly without merit.
On June 2, 1985, the Kays wrote Summit requesting the
release of seven lots.

Once such written notice was received,

the Investors were required, by law, to advise the trustee to
reconvey the property within thirty days after they received
the written request from the Kays.

See Utah Code Annotated

§57-1-33 (1953).
That statutory requirement was incorporated, by law,
into the Trust Deed:
It is the general rule that parties are
presumed to contract with reference to
existing statutes (citations omitted) and a
statute which affects the subject matter of
a contract is incorporated into and becomes
a part thereof. (Citation omitted.) If the
parties to the contract wish to provide for
other legal principles to govern their
contractual relationship, they must be
expressly set forth in the contract. Absent
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a clear intent to the contrary disclosed by
the contract, the general law will govern.
(Citations omitted.)
Wagner v. Wagner, 621 P.2d 1279, 1282 (Wash. 1980).

See

Farmers' & Merchants' Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, 262 U.S.
649, 660 (1923) ("Laws which subsist at the time and place of
the making of a contract . . . enter into and form a part of
it, as fully as if they had been expressly referred to or
incorporated in its terms.

This principle embraces alike those

laws which affect its construction and those which affect its
enforcement or discharge.")

This Court has consistently

followed that general rule.

See, e.g., George v. Oren Limited

and Associates, 672 P.2d 732, 737 (Utah 1983); Beehive Medical
Electronics Inc. v. Industrial Commission, 583 P.2d 53, 60
(Utah 1978); Quagliana v. Exquisite Home Builders, Inc., 538
P.2d 301, 308 (Utah 1975).
In this case, Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-33 (1953) was a
statute in existence at the time the parties entered into the
Trust Deed and specifically governs the imposition of liability
upon a beneficiary under a trust deed for failure to request a
timely release from the trustee.
The undisputed facts clearly show that the Respondents
complied with those statutory and contractual requirements.
Within thirty days of the date Summit allegedly received the
June 2, 1985 letter from the Kays, Mr. Southwick, on behalf of
the Investors, requested the trustee, Mr. Buehler, to reconvey
the seven lots.

In fact, Mr. Buehler reconveyed the seven lots
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on the thirtieth day (i,e w July 1, 1985), and the reconveyance
was recorded July 3, 1985.
Because the Respondents requested the trustee to
reconvey the seven lots within thirty days of receipt of
written request as required by statute, they satisfied all
contractual and statutory obligations,
VII.

The Kays Stated No Claim For Tortious
Breach Of Implied Covenant of Good
Faith And Fair Dealing.

Count IV of the Kays' Complaint sought recovery for "a
tortious breach of [the Respondents'] implied covenants and
duties of good faith and fair dealing."
the Complaint.

(R.12 to 13.)

See paragraph 28 of

(Emphasis added.)

In Beck v.

Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 798-799 (Utah 1985),
this Court rejected the contention that breach of an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing gives rise to an
independent tort action.

The lower court, therefore, properly

dismissed Count IV.
On appeal, however, the Kays have apparently dropped
their earlier contentions and now argue that the Respondents
breached their implied contractual duties to release lots by
June 24, 1985. This argument is without merit.
The Kays are asking this Court to rule that the
implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing obligate
parties to a contract to alter the express terms of the
contract and the statutes which are incorporated therein in
order to benefit one party.

There is no such duty.
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In fact,

this Court has expressly recognized that where there are
express terms concerning a specific contract right, there can
be no claim for breach of an implied covenant of a different or
contradictory nature.

See Rio Algom Corp. v. Jimco Ltd., 618

P.2d 497, 505 (Utah 1980).
Finally, even if an implied covenant required the
Respondents to act in good faith to aid the Kays in having
seven lots available to Mr. Sprouse by June 24, 1985, then that
obligation was clearly met.

Summit Systems, Inc. made several

good faith efforts to accomplish that reconveyance.

It

attempted to have the lots reconveyed by June 24, 1985, but was
unable to do so because the trustee was out-of-town on
vacation.

It attempted to convince a title company to act as a

substitute trustee to effect the reconveyance, but was
unsuccessful. As soon as the trustee returned from vacation,
the reconveyance was made. All of this was done within thirty
days of the June 2, 1985 request for reconveyance.

There is

simply no legal or factual basis for the contention that the
Respondents failed to act in good faith.
VIII.

The Lower Court Properly Ruled That A
Dispute Had Arisen Regarding The Number
Of Lots To Be Released; That The
Kays Compromised Their Claim; And That
There Was No Failure On The Part Of The
Respondents With Respect To That
Compromise, Modification And/Or
Accord And Satisfaction.

Faced with the realization that they have no cause of
action for the Respondents' alleged failure to convey lots by

-31-

June 24, 1985, the Kays now argue that lots should have been
released in response to a demand for the release of twelve lots
allegedly made on January 10, 1985.
As demonstrated in preceding sections, Respondents had
no contractual or other duty to release any lots as a result of
the calling of letters of credit.

Thus, the Kays' argument is

fatally flawed from its beginning.
The lower court set forth other grounds for dismissing
the Kays* claim that lots should have been released in response
to the January 10, 1985 letter:
Plaintiffs* claim . . . is based upon a
letter dated January 10, 1985. Defendants
claim the matter was compromised and a new
letter was sent on June 2, 1985 demanding
the release of seven (7) lots. There is no
dispute that the seven (7) lots were
released within thirty (30) days of that
demand.
The facts as admitted by both sides show
the Plaintiffs making payments late or
failing to make payments with the result
that the "additional security" was
utilized. There was a dispute whether lots
could be released. The June 2, 1985 letter
is an abandonment of the earlier and greater
claim for releases and does constitute a
compromise and the subsequent release
constitutes an accord and satisfaction. The
Court does not find a failure on the part of
the Defendants . . . .
The lower court rendered that decision based upon the
following record:
(1)

The Kays demanded that twelve lots be released;

(2)

The Kays admitted Summit maintained that they were not
entitled to any lot releases.
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Indeed, Respondents

have consistently maintained that position in
correspondence between the parties, (see L. Kay depo.
Exh. 18, R.452-454); in the litigation below, and on
appeal.
(3)

In the Spring of 1986, the parties compromised and the
Respondents agreed to release and the Kays agreed to
accept seven lots.
Parties to a contract are free to modify all or any

portion of the terms of that contract, and any pre-modification
contractual rights which conflict with the modified contracts
are deemed waived or excused.

See Rapp v. Mountain States

Telephone & Telegraph Co., 606 P.2d 1189, 1191 (Utah 1980);
Cheney v. Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205, 381 P.2d 86, 89 (1963).
Parties are free to compromise disputes.

Parties are free to

agree to substituted performance to constitute an accord and
satisfaction.

Whatever the name given to this principle, the

fact is that the Kays agreed to accept seven lots without any
change in any other contractual provision.
Contrary to the Kays' arguments before this Court,
there was clearly a dispute as to whether any lots should be
released when the letters of credit were drawn.

To resolve

that dispute, in the Spring of 1985, the parties agreed to
compromise on that single issue and release seven lots.

The

record presented to the lower court further indicates that not
one additional term of the parties' obligations was altered by
the parties.

In fact, the June 2, 1985 letter indicated on its

face that Mr. Southwick was insisting upon the Kays' compliance
-33-

with the contract terms by insisting that the request for
release of lots be in writing.

Accordingly, pursuant to their

contractual and statutory obligations, the Investors were
required to instruct the trustee to release those lots within
thirty days of receipt of the Kays' June 2, 1985 written
request.

It is undisputed that they did so.
The Kays strenuously objected to the presentation of

the compromise/modification/accord and satisfaction argument on
the grounds it had not been plead as an affirmative defense.
Respondents were not barred from raising that theory.
Prior to their Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion
for Summary Judgment, the Kays had never indicated that they
were relying upon the January 10, 1985 letter as a basis of a
claim against Respondents.

The Complaint never mentioned it,

nor did it appear in any other pleading.
When presented with this new theory, Respondents
raised the new defense, but it was a new defense in name only.
Respondents had previously plead as affirmative defenses that
the Kays had waived their claims and that the Respondents had
met all their obligations under the agreements and
understandings of the parties.

(R.267.)

If the Kays agreed to

accept seven lots, such would constitute a waiver of their
claim for twelve lots.

If the parties agreed that Respondents

were only to convey seven lots, then the Respondents had
complied with that obligation.

While the "magic words" —
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accord and satisfaction —

had not been plead, the Kays were

put on notice of the Respondents' contentions.

That is all

that is required by the pleading requirements.2

See Cheney

v. Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205, 381 P.2d 86, 91 (1963).
Finally, this argument is a red-herring because the
Kays were not prejudiced by the accord and satisfaction
defense.

The lower court specifically granted the Kays an

opportunity to respond to the accord and satisfaction argument
by submitting an additional memorandum and additional
evidence.

(R.1009-1012.)

The Kays then failed to so respond.

Based upon the undisputed facts before it, the lower
court properly ruled that the parties had reached a compromise,
had modified the contract, and/or had reached an accord and
satisfaction which barred any claim that Respondents improperly
failed to release lots in response to the January 10, 1985
letter.
CONCLUSION
This is not a difficult or convoluted case.

The Kays

are attempting to avoid the consequences of their failure to
make the Trust Deed Note payments.

2

With this lawsuit, the Kays

Summit Systems, Inc. has maintained that it never received
the alleged January 10, 1985 letter. (See R.564.) For the
purposes of the motion for summary judgment, however, it argued
as though that letter had been received. It would be anomalous
to require Respondents to raise an affirmative defense based on
correspondence which they never received.
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have attempted to deny or delay the Investors the opportunity
to recover the funds they invested on the basis of the Trust
Deed and Trust Deed Note which the Kays freely executed.
The arguments presented by the Kays regarding
"unconscionability" and the Respondents' alleged breach of
contract are without merit.
With respect to the claim of unconscionability, the
terms of the Trust Deed which are now in question were set
forth in a separate typewritten sheet and were discussed at
closing.

Under Utah law, the terms which are now contested by

the Kays are not unconscionable.

The Respondents were not

responsible for the Kays' perceived need to execute the loan
contracts.

The Kays subsequently ratified that contract.

Finally, it is too late to "reform" the contract terms against
the Respondent-Investors.
Nor is there any basis for the Kays' claims that
Respondents breached the agreements by failing to timely
release lots.

The June 2, 1985 letter is the written

communication upon which the Kays must base their claim.

It is

clear that the Respondents complied with any contractual and
statutory duties with respect to lot releases after that letter
was received.

It is unfortunate that the trustee was on

vacation prior to June 24, 1985, when the Kays wanted the lots
released.

The fact that Respondents were unable to reconvey

the lots sooner than the contract and statute required,
however, does not give rise to a breach of contract claim,
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particularly when the Respondents were not only able to request
the trustee to reconvey the lots within thirty days of the
written request as required by U.C.A. §57-1-33 (1953), but more
importantly, were actually able to reconvey the lots on the
thirtieth day.
Based upon the foregoing, the summary judgment of the
lower court should be affirmed in all respects.
DATED this 18th day of November, 1987.
GIAUQUE, WILLIAMS,
WILCOX & BENDINGER
500 Kearns Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (8QJ) 533-8383

Attorneys for
Defendants-Respondents
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of
RESPONDENTS1 BRIEF were mailed, first-class postage prepaid,
this 18th day of November, 1987, to the following:
Leslie W. Slaugh
Howard, Lewis & Petersen
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603

f
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Ruling
Trust Deed Note
Trust Deed
Utah Code Annotated §57-1-33

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

LAWRENCE C. KAY, JOY KAY,
ROBERT L. KAY, and TERESA KAY,
Plaintiffs,

R U L I N G

vs.
SUMMIT SYSTEMS, INC., a
corporation, et al.,
Defendants.

Civil

No.

86-CV-48U

The parties willingly entered into negotiations over the loan.
The final terms were well understood by all and were specifically
agreed to by Plaintiffs.

Count I is hereby dismissed with pre-

judice.
The Court is not persuaded that a beneficiary of an agreement
owes any fiduciary duty to the Trustor.
authority to the contrary.

Plaintiff has cited no

Count III is hereby dismissed with

prejudice.
This Court will not recognize a cause of action for tortious
breach of implied covenant and fair dealing.

Court IV is dismissed

with prejudice.
The Court having dismissed Counts III and IV finds nothing to
sustain Plaintiffs' Claim for punitive damages.

Count VIII is

dismissed with prejudice.

EXHIBIT A

/w

The remaining Counts, II, V, VI and VII, are dependant upon
Plaintiffs1 claim of wrongful refusal to release lots.

Plain-

tiffs1 claim this is based upon a letter dated January 10, 1985.
Defendants claim the matter was compromised and a new letter was
sent on June 2, 1985 demanding the release of seven (7) lots.
There is no dispute that the seven (7) lots were released within
thirty (30) days of that demand.
The facts as admitted by both sides show the Plaintiffs
making payments late or failing to make payments with the result
that the "additional security" was utilized.
whether lots could be released.

There was a dispute

The June 2, 1985 letter is an

abandonment of the earlier and greater claim for releases and does
constitute a compromise and the subsequent release constitutes an
accord and satisfaction.
part of the Defendants.

The Court does not find a failure on the
Counts II, V, VI and VII are also

dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this

day of January, 1987.
BY THE COURT:

cc:

Richard W. Giauque
Ray G. Martineau
Robert M. Anderson
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TRUST DEED NOTE
$806,000.00

_ - -ah

January X3'U\

I

For value received, we, or any of us, promise to pay to SUM
SYSTEMS, INC. or order, at its above office in Utah, the principal
Eight Hundred Six Thousand Doll ars ($806,000,00) with interest ther
from January 2i5Mi' , 1984 until paid at the rate of SEVENTEEN (177.) perc
per annum, both principal and interest payable only in lawful money
the United States of America.
This Note evidences a loan made or to be made by SUMMIT SYSTE
INC. to Borrower in the principal amount hereof and is secured by
Trust Deed or even date herewith.
This note is calculated on a da
interest basis.
It is understood and agreed, Chat the first installment of
accured interest shall be due on the 1st day of June, 1984. Then, subseq
installments in the amount of ($42,659.37) Forty Two Thousand Six Hund
Fifty Nine and 37/100's dollars, including interest, shall be due
the 1st day of September 1984, and one of said installments to be p
on the 1st day of each and every quarter thereafter until the 1st
of December, 1987, at which time the whole of the unpaid princip
together with accrued interest, shall be due; each of said quarte
installments to be applied first to the payment of accrued inter
on the unpaid balance, and the balance thereof to be credited on s
principal.
And in case default be made in the .payment of any of said installme
of principal or interest at the times and in the manner aforesaid, t!
such installment or payment, installments, or payments, so in defau
shall be added to and become a part of the principal sum, and from
date when each installment should have been paid until it is paid
shall bear twenty one percent rate of interest as the principal de;
or in the performance of any agreement, covenant or condition in
Trust Deed securing this note, the holder thereof, at its option, ,
without notice or demand, may declare the entire principal balance .
accrued interest due and payable.
In Che event any installment of principal and interest shall rem;
unpaid for a period of 15 days after due, Che undersigned, at the opt:
of Che holder hereof and upon demand, agree to pay as a late chai
a sum equivalent to FIVE (57.) percent of the principal amount of si
installment. Default is defined as 15 days late on any payment.
If this note be placed for collection, either with or without sui
the undersigned jointly and severally agree Co pay all costs and expen*
thereof, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
The makers, guarantors and endorsers hereby severally tfaive presenting
for payment, demand, notice of dishonor, protest and of non-payme
of chis note, and all defenses on the ground of any extension of ti
of payment that may be given by the holder to them or any of them; <
also agree that further payments of principal or interest in renev
Chereof shaLl not release them as makers, guarantors or endorsers.
In the event the undersigned is unable to pay off the outstandi
principal and interest due on 12-1-87 due solely to external financ:
conditions affecting this and like property generally, then and oi
Chen will the lender extend the term for two more years with the follow:
conditions
strictly met;
(1) A 47. modification fee of the outstand:
balance paid at the time of modification:
(2) The quarterly paym<
will increase so as to amortize fully the 'outstanding balance due
12-1-87 over the Cwo year period ending 12-1-89 at the same rate
interest set forth in Che note secured hereby: (3) To verify the existem
of Che above mentioned external financial conditions and market condici.
Che Borrower will submit zz the Lender uritter. -verification that
Borrower has been denied re-financing by Chree commercial banks soL,
because of adverse financial condicions and market conditions genera
affecting Chis and like oCher property.
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TRUST DEED
With Assignment of Rents
THIS TRUST DEED, made this ...J?J.*L.
between

Lawr.enc.e...C

Kay.

Rohe.rt:..L.....Kay
whose address is

day of

January.

and

Joy...Kay.

and

T e r e s a .Kay

1940..East. .250Q..Sauth
(Str*rt »nd numWr)

, 19.8.4.

, as TRUSTOR,
Naples

Utah

(City)

J-...Scptt..Buehler

.....Summit-.Sy.s.teiDS..Inc..

84078 '
(SltU)

,

RS TRUSTEE,*

and

, as BENEFICIARY,

WITNESSETH: That Trustor CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST,
WITH POWER OF SALE, the following described property, situated in

.Uintah

County, State of Utah:

''Lots 1 through 95 inclusive of Plat "AM YELLOW HILL ESTATES
SUBDIVISION, excluding Lots 10, 20 & 28-34. Lots 1 through
51 inclusive of Plat rtB" YELLOW HILL ESTATES SUBDIVISION,
being located in the West half of Section 18, Township 4 South,
Range 21 East, Salt Lake meridan.

Together with all buildings, fixtures and improvements thereon and all water rights, rights of
way, easements, rents, issues, profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges and appurtenances
thereunto belonging, now or hereafter used or enjoyed with said property, or any part thereof,
SUBJECT, HOWEVER, to the right, power and authority hereinafter given to and conferred upon
Beneficiary to collect and apply such rents, issues, and profits;
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING (1) payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a promissory note of even date herewith, in the principal sum of $ 8 0 6 , 0 0 0 . 0 0
, made by
Trustor, payable to the order of Beneficiary at the times, in the manner and with interest as therein
set forth, and any extensions and/or renewals or modifications thereof; (2) the performance of
each agreement of Trustor herein contained; (3) the payment of such additional loans or advances as
hereafter may be made to Trustor, or his successors or assigns, when evidenced by a promissory
note or notes reciting that they are secured by this Trust Deed; and (4) the payment of all sums
expended or advanced by Beneficiary under or pursuant to the terms hereof, together with interest
thereon as herein provided.
"NOTE: Trustee must he a member of the Utah State Bar; a bank, buildine and loan association or savings
and loan association authorized to d o such business in Utah, a corporation authorized to do a trust business in
Utah, or a title insurance or abstract company authorized to do such business in Utah.

EXHIBIT C

p
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^

TO PROTECT THE SECURITY 0~ THIS TRUST DEED, TRUSTOR AGREES

30 L

1: T o keep said property in go.... condition and repair; not to remove or drr
,sh any building thereon, to
complete or restore promptl) and in good and workmanlike, manner any building wlmli may be constructed
damaged or destroyed thereon, to comply with all l a * v cuvrn.inN an<l restrictions .iffet hng ••»*•'' pfoprrlv . not
to commit nr permit u a s i e therrof. not lu lummil, suffer or permit an> ait upon said property in v i«.I.ili..n of lav*, tr.
do all other arts which fn.ni the character or use of said property mav be reason.ibl\ necess^rv. the specific
enumerations herein nut excluding the general, and. »f the loan si•<-tired hereby or a m part lli»-r«-«»f is being ..!»
Lamed fur tbo purpose of financing Construction of improvements tin said property. Trustor lurther agrees:
(a) T o enmmenee construction promptly and to pursue same with reasonable diligence t«» completion
in accordance with plans and s|xufications satisfactory to Beneficiary, and
(b)

T o allow Beneficiary to inspect said property at all turns during construction

Trustee, upon presentation to it of an affidavit signed by Beneficiary, setting forth facts showing a default
by Trustor under this numbered paragraph, is authori/.i-d to accept as true and conclusive all facts and state
menLs therein, and lu act thereon hereunder.
2. T o provide and maintain insurance, of such type or types and amount'; as Beneficiary may require, on
the improvements now existing or hereafter erected or placed tin said properi* Sot b insurance skill be carried
in companies approved bv Benefici.irv v*ith loss payable clauses in favor ol and in tnrm a i i t p l . i b l e to llciu-ficiarv
In event of loss. Trustor shall give immediate notice to Beneficiary, who may tn.ik. prool of loss, and each insurance
company concerned is hereby authorized and directed to make payment' (or >m h loss dirinily lu B. nefuiary
instead of to Trustor and Beneficiarv jointly, and the insurance prm«t tis. or nn> part thereof. ma\ be applied
by Beneficiarv. at its option, to reduction of the indebtedness hereby secured or to the restoration or repair ol
the property damaged
3. T o deliver to. pav for and maintain with Benefit iary until the indebtedness secured hereby is paid in full,
such evidence of \itl»« a* Beneficiary may require, including abstract* ol title or policies ol ink- insurance and
any extensions or renewals thereof or supplements thereto.
4. T o appear in and defend any action or proceeding purporting to affect the security hereof, the title to
said property, or the rights or powers of Beneficiary or Trustee; and should Beneficiary or Trustee elect to
also appear in or defend any such action or proceeding, to pay all costs ami expenses, including cost of evidence of title and attorney's fees in a reasonable sum incurred by Beneficiary or Trustee.
5. T o pay at least 10 days before delinquency all taxes and assessments affecting said properly, including
all assessments upon water company stock and all rents, assessment*, and charges for water, appurtenant to or
used in connection with said property, to pay. when due. all encumbrances, charges, and liens with interest,
on said property or any part thereof, which at any time appear to bv prior or superior hereto; to pay all costs.
fees, and expenses of this Trust.
6
Should Trustor fail to make any payment or to do any act as herein provided, then Beneficiary or
Trustee, but without obligation so to do and without notice to or demand upon Trustor and without releasing
Trustor from any obligation hereof, may: Make or do the same in such manner and to such extent as either may
d e e m necessary to protect the security hereof. Beneficiary or Trustee being authorized to enter upon said
property for such purposes; commence, appear in and defend any action or proceeding purporting to affect the
security hereof or the rights of powers of Beneficiary or Trustee; pay. purchase, contest, or compromise any
encumbrance, charge or lien which in the judgment of either appears to be prior or superior hereto, and in exercising any such powers, incur any liability, expend whatever amounts in its absolute discretion it may deem
necessary therefor, including cost of evidence of title, employ counsel, and pay his reasonable Ives.
7. T o pay immediately and without demand all sums expended hereunder by Beneficiary or Trustee,
with interest from date of expenditure at the rate of ten per cent ( l O r t ) per annum until paid, and the repayment thereof shall be secured hereby.
I T IS M U T U A L L Y A G R E E D THAT:
8. Should said property or any part thereof be taken or damaged by reason of any public improvement
or condemnation proceeding, or damaged by fire, or earthquake, or in any other manner. Beneficiary shall be
entitled to all compensation, awards, and other payments or relief therefor, and shall be entitled at its option
to commence, appear m and prosecute in its own name, any action or proceedings, or to make any compro
mise or settlement, in connection with such taking or damage. All such compensation, awards, damages, rights
of action and proceeds uncluding the proceeds of any policies of fire and Olb^r insurance affecting said property,
are hereby assigned to Beneficiary, who may. after deducting therefrom all its expenses, including attorneys fees,
apply the same on any indebtedness secured hereby. Trustor agrees to execute such further assignments of any
compensation, award, damages, and rights of action and proceeds as Beneficiary or Trustee may require.
9. At any time and from time to time upon writtten request of Beneficiary, payment of its fees and presentation of this Trust Deed and the note for endorsement (in case of full reconveyance, for cancellation and
retention), without affecting the liability of any person for the payment of the indebtedness secured hereby,
Trustee may (a) consent to the making of any map or plat of said property; (b) join in granting any easement or creating any restriction thereon; (c) join in any subordination or other agreement affecting this Trust Deed
or the lien or charge thereof, (d) reconvey, without warranty, all or any part of said property T h e grantee in
any reconveyance may be described as "the person or persons entitled thereto', and the n-> itals therein of any
matters or facts shall be conclusive proof of truthfulness thereof. Tiustor agrees to pay reasonable Trustee's
fees for any of the services mentioned in this paragraph.
10. As additional necurity. Trustor hereby assigns Benefit iary, during the continuance of these trusts, all
rents, issues, royalties, and profits of the property affected by this Trust Deed and of any personal property
located thereon Until Trustor shall default in the payment of any indebtedness secured hereby or in the performance of any agreement hereunder. Trustor shall have thi right to collect all such rents, issues, royalties,
and profits earned prior to default as they become due and payable. If Trustor shall default as aforesaid.
Trustor's right to collect any of such moneys shall cease and Beneficiary shall have the right, with or without
taking possession of the property affected hereby, to collect all rents, royalties, issues, and profits. Failure or
discontinuance of Beneficiary at any time or from time to t i m - to c o l l e t any such moneys shall not in any
manner affect the subsequent enforcement by Beneficiary of the right. power, and authority to collect the same.
Nothing contained herein, nor the exercise of the right by Ber.eficiary t collect, shall be. or be construed to
be. an affirmation by Beneficiary of any tenancy, lease or option, nor an assumption of liability under, nor a
•ubordination of the lien or charge of this Trust Deed to any such tenancy, lease or option.
11. Upon any default by Trustor hereunder. Beneficiary may at any time without notice, either in
person, by agent, or by a receiver to be appointed by a court (Trustor hereby consenting to the appointment of
Beneficiary as such receiver), and without regard to the adequacy of any security for the indebtedness hereby
secured, enter upon and take possession of said property or any part thereof, in its own name sue for or
otherwise collect said rents, issues, and profits, including those past due and unpaid, and apply the same, lesa
costs and expenses of operation and collection, including reasonable attorney's fees, upon any indebtedness
secured hereby, and in such order as Benef;uary may determine.
12. T h e entering upon and taking possession of said property, the collecton of such rents, issues, and
profits, or the proceeds of fire and other insurance policies, or compensation or awards for any taking or
damage of said property, and the application or release thereof as aforesaid, shall not cure or waive any
default or notice of default hereunder or invalidate any act done pursuant to such notice.
13. T h e failure on the part of Beneficiary to promptly enforce any right, hereunder shall not operate as
a waiver of auch right and the waiver by Beneficiary of any default shall not constitute a waiver of any other
or subsequent default
14 Time is of the essence hereof. Upon default by Trustor in the payment of any indebtedness secured hereby or in the performance of any agreement hereunder, all sums secured hereby shall immediately become due
and payable at the option of Beneficiary. In the event of such defauk. Beneficiarv may execute or cause Trustee
to execute a written notice of default anrt of election t o cause said property to be sold to satisfy the obligations
hereof and Trustee shall file such notice for record in each county wherein said property or some part or
parcel thereof LS situated. Beneficiary also shall deposit with Trustee, the note and all documents evidencing
expenditures secured hereby.
l*»a Due on S a l e .
The loan e v i d e n c e d by the note s e c u r e d hereby was i a d e in r e l i a n c e upon Trustor
c r e d i t and f i n a n c i a l c a p a c i t y and p r o p e r t y a a a a g e a e n t e x p e r t i s e .
A c c o r d i n g l y , in the e v e n t the Trustor or
s u c c e s s o r s in i n t e r e s t s h a l l e i t h e r s e l l , convey or a l i e n a t e the h e r e i n d e s c r i b e d p r o p e r t y or any part t h e n
i n t e r e s t t h e r e i n w i t h o u t the w r i t t e n p e r a i s s i o n of l e n d e r or be d i v e s t e d of t i t l e in any a a n e r , whether v o h
or i n v o l u o t i r i l v . then the f u l l p r i n c i p a l of the Note s e c u r e d hereby t o o a t h e r * i t h f u l l *nd -ill other aioun!
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rr s a i d n o t e ,

t h i s Deed of Trust r t the o p t i o n of the h o l d e r , w i t h o u t deaand and n o t i c e ,

and p a y a b l e .

Beneficary's

written consent shall

not be u n r e a s o n a b l y

shall

immediately

Lccoi

withheld.

15
After the lap»* of auch tin
* may then be required by law following t,
ecordation of laid notice of
default aiid notice ol default and notice of tale having been given as then required by law, T i u s l r e , without dNnand
on Trustor ahall sell aaid property on the dale and at the time and place drsignat?d in **id nonce of »nle. either as
a whole or in separate parceli. and in tuch order as it may determine (but subject to any statutory right of Trusior to
direct the order in which auch property, if consisting of aeveral known lots or parcels, shall be told), at public
auction to the highest bidder, the purchaae price payable in lawful money of the United States at the time of
postpone the tale from time to
%Jl^e T h e person conducting the aale may, for any cause he deems expedient,
time until it shall be completed and. in every case, notice of postponement *hall be given by public declaration
thereof by such person at the time and place last appointed for the sale, provided, if the sale is postponed
for longer than one day beyond the d*y designated in the notice of aale. notice thereof shall be given in the
sjune manner at the original notice of tale. Truitee ah all execute and deliver to the purchaser its Deed conveying said property to told, but without any covenant or warranty, express or implied T h e recitals in the
Deed of any matters or facta shall be conclusive proof of the truthfulness thereof Any person, including Bene
ficiary. may bid at the tale. Trustee ahaJI apply the proceeds o( the tale to payment o( (1) the costs and
expenses of exercising the power of sale and of the aale, including the payment of the Trustee's and attorney's
fees; (2) cost of any evidence of title procured in connection with auch aale and revenue stamps on T r u s t e e ! Deed;
(3) all sums expended under the terms hereof, not then repaid, with accrued interest at I0 r 4 per annum from date
of expenditure. (4) all other sums then secured hereby; and (5) the remainder, if any. to the person or persons
legally entitled thereto, or the Trustee, in its discretion, may deposit the balance of such proceeds with the County
Clerk of the county in which the sale took place.

*^fl
U\ >

16 Upon the occurrence of any default hereunder. Beneficiary shall have the option to declare all turns
aecured, hereby immediately due and payable and foreclose this Trust Deed in the manner provided by law
for the foreclosure of mortgages on real property and Beneficiary shall be entitled to recover in such proceeding all costs and expenses incident thereto, including a reasonable attorney's fee in such amount as shall be
fixed by the court.
17. Beneficiary may appoint a successor trustee at any time by filing for record in the office of the County
Recorder of each county in which aaid property or t o m e part thereof is situated, a substitution of trustee From
the time the substitution is filed for record, the new trustee shall succeed to all the powers, duties, authority
and title of the trustee named herein or of any successor trustee. Each such aubstitution shall be executed and
acknowledged, and notice thereof shall be given and proof thereof made, in the manner provided by law.
18. This Trust Deed shall apply to, inure to the benefit of. and bind all parties hereto, their heirs, legatee*,
devise-es. adminstrators, executors, successors and assigns. All obligations of Trustor hereunder are joint and
several T h e term "Beneficiary" shall mean the owner and holder, including any pledgee, of the note secured
hereby. In this Trust Deed, whenever the context requires, the masculine gender includes the feminine a n d / o r
neuter, and the singular number includes the plural.
19. Trustee accepts this Trust when this Trust Deed, duly executed and acknowledged, is made a public
record as provided by law. Trustee is not obligated to notify any party hereto of pending sale under any other
Trust Deed or of any action or proceeding in which Trustor, Beneficiary, or Trustee shall be a party, unless
brought by Trust-e.
20.

This Trust Deed

shall be construed

according: to the laws of the State of Utah

21. T h e undersigned Trustor requeats that a copy of any notice of default and of any notice of sale
hereunder be mailed to him at the address hereinbefore set forth.
2 1 a . Personal

L i a b i l i t y . T r u s t o r and i t s c o n s t i t u e n t p a r t n e r s s h a l l p e r s o n a l l y

due under the loan s e c u r e d h e r e b y .
Security Instruaents, Beneficary

l i a b l e for a l l

In the e v e n t of a d e f a u l t due hereunder or t h e Note or

s h a l l have the r i g h t t o p r o c e e d d i r e c t l y and i a a e d i a t e l y

against

a n d / o r i t s c o n s t i t u e n t p a r t n e r s w i t h o u t f i r s t p r o c e e d i n g a g a i n s t the p r o p e r t y through f o r e c l o s u r e
o t h e r w i s e and such p r o c e e d i n g i s not t o be deeaed an i r r e v o c a b l e e l e c t i o n of
2 1 b . Due on Encuabcrancc. T r u s t o r c o v e n a n t s during t h e t e n
or h y p o t h e c a t e the p r o p e r t y as s e c u r i t y for a d d i t i o n a l
and i n t e r e s t due and p a y a b l e in f u l l
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j u n i o r debt w i t h o u t w r i t t e n c o n s e n t of the

pledge
beneficar

outstanding

with out d e i a n d or n o t i c e .
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Trustor
or

reaedies.

h e r e o f not to e n c u a b e r , a o r t g a g e ,

and a breach of t h i s c o v e n a n t S h a l l e n t i t l e l e n d e r , at i t s s o l e o p t i o n , t o d e c l a r e the e n t i r e
principal

aaounts

related

L

\r
(If Trustor an Individual)

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF UINTAH
On the

.23rd

day of

AD

January-

- 19-84... personally

appeared before me .]tawrence_C,,..K^^
,
the^igner(s) of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that .t.hey... executed the
. *am«\

•• C ,.

'j-.

^

QL\Jbu!Mttim
Notary Public residing

V

^-

:

My-1 Commission Expires:
• \ o L b e r ^ , , i985
'-y.m ° .:.• \ . •'/"•/

ST'ATE OF OTAH
COUNTY OF

Notary Public residing at:

Vernal,.. Utah
(If Trustor a Corporation)

8S

On the

*
day of

appeared before me

, A.D. 19
% who

, personally

being by me duly sworn,

says that he is the
of
the corporation that executed the above and foregoing instrument and that said instrument was
signed in behalf of said corporation by authority of its by-laws (or by authority of a resolution
of its board of directors) and said
to me that said corporation executed the same.

acknowledged

Notary Public residing at:
My Commission Expires:

P10000!^1
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SCHEDULE A
22.
Partial Releases.
Upon receipt of the
written request of the Trustor, and upon receipt of
the principal payments hereinafter set forth, the beneficiary shall instruct the Trustee to deliver to the
Trustor Deeds of Partial Reconveyance as follows:
(a)
Plat n A M :
Lots 1 through 27 excluding
Lots 10, 20, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, and 34 upon receipt
of $15,000.00 for each lot to be so reconveyed.
(b)
Plat "A":
Lots 35 through 95 upon receipt
of $13,000.00 principal' for each lot to be so reconveyed.
(c)
Plat "B":
Lots 1 through 51 upon receipt
of $5,000.00 principal for each lot to be so reconveyed.
23. Letter (s) of Credit. As additional security
for the indebtedness the Trustor has delivered or shall
deliver to the beneficiary the following
irrevocable
and unconditional letter(s) of credit drawn for the
Trustor's account:
Bank:

First Security Bank of Utah N.A.
("The first bank")
Letter of Credit Number:062-060-8980-50005
Amount:
$110,000.00
Expiration Date:
July 10th 1985
Bank:
First Interstate Bank
.
("The second bank")
Letter of Credit Number:
2003 and 2004
Amount:$130,000.00 (#2003) & $40,000.00 (#2004)
Expiration Date: Both July 10th 1985
The beneficiary shall have the right to draw upon the
letter(s) of credit or any renewal or extension thereof,
in whole - or in part, upon the occurance of any one
or more of the following events:
(A)
1.
the occurance of any event of default under
this mortgage; or
2.
The Trustor's failure to deliver to the
beneficiary, no less than thirty
(30) days prior to
the expiration date of the letter(s) of credit or any
renewal or extension thereof, a renewal or extension
of the letter(s) of credit for a term of not less than
one year; or
3.
Any action by the Trustor or the first or
second
bank
which,
in
the beneficiary's
discretion,
reasonably
exercised, may
jeopardize
its
rights
to
draw on the letter(s) of credit;
(B)
Proceeds of any draw upon the letter(s)
of credit may be applied by the beneficiary to be a
payment
of
accrued
interest
(including
any
accrued
interest the payment of which was otherwise deferred),
late
charges,
principal
(including
any
pre-payment
charge occasioned by a principal payment), or any other
obligation
arising
out
of
the
Trustor's
obligation
to the beneficiary under this Deed of Trust or the
Trust Deed Note, in such manner as the beneficiary,
in its sole discretion, deems appropriate.
(C)
Provided there is no default or condition
which but for the furnishing of notice or the passage
of time would constitute an event of default under
this Trust
Deed, the beneficiary
shall release its
rights in the letter(s) of credit and surrender the
letter(s) of credit to the first and second bank upon
the principal reduction of the Trust Deed Note as secured
by this Deed of Trust in the amount of Two Hundred
Eighty Thousand ($280,000.00) Dollars.

PlfMDOCSji

Real Estate

57-1-33.

balance due upon the obligation for which the trust
deed was given as security, and in such action the
complaint shall set forth the entire amount of the
indebtedness which was secured by such trust deed,
the amount for which such property was sold, and
the fair market value thereof at the date of sale.
Before rendering judgment, the court shall find the
fair market value at the date of sale of the property
sold. The court may not render judgment for more
than the amount by which the amount of the indebtedness with interest, costs, and expenses of sale,
including trustee's and attorney's fees, exceeds the
fair market value of the property as of the date of
the sale. In any action brought under this section,
the prevailing party shall be entitled to collect its
costs and reasonable attorney fees incurred in bringing an action under this section.
1985
57-1-33. Satisfaction of obligation secured by
trust deed - Reconveyance of trust property.
When the obligation secured by any trust deed has
been satisfied, the trustee shall, upon written request
by the beneficiary, reconvey the trust property. The
reconveyance may designate the grantee therein as
"the person or persons entitled thereto." The beneficiary under such trust deed shall deliver to the
trustor or his successor in interest the trust deed and
the note or other evidence of the obligation so satisfied. A n y beneficiary under such trust deed who
refuses to request a reconveyance from the trustee
for a period of thirty days after written demand
therefor is made by the trustor or his successor in
interest shall be liable to the trustor or his successor
in interest, as the case may be, for double damages
resulting from such refusal, or such trustor or his
successor in interest may bring an action against the
beneficiary and trustee to compel a reconveyance of
the trust property and in such action the judgment
of the court shall be that the trustee reconvey the
trust property and that the beneficiary pay to the
trustor, or his successor in interest, as the case may
be, the costs of suit including a reasonable attorney's fee and all damages resulting from the
refusal of the beneficiary to request a reconveyance
as hereinabove provided.
i%i
57-1-34. Sale of trust property by trustee Foreclosure of trust deed - Limitation of
actions.
The trustee's sale of property under a trust deed
shall be made, or an action to foreclose a trust deed
as "provided by law for the foreclosure of mortgages
on real property shall be commenced, within the
period prescribed by law for the commencement of
an action on the obligation secured by the trust
deed.
i%i
57-1-35. Trust deeds - Transfer of debts secured
by - Transfer of security.
The transfer of any debt secured by a trust deed
shall operate as a transfer of the security therefor.
1961

57-1-36. Trust deeds - Instruments entitled to be
recorded - Assignment of a beneficial interest.
Any trust deed, substitution of trustee, assignment
of a beneficial interest under a trust deed, notice of
default, trustee's deed, reconveyance of the trust
property and any instrument by which any trust
deed is subordinated or waived as to priority, when
acknowledged as provided by law, shall be entitled
to be recorded, and shall, from the time of filing the
same with the recorder for record, impart notice of
the contents thereof to all persons, including subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers for value,
except that the recording of an assignment of a
18
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beneficial interest in the trust deed shall not in itself
be deemed notice of such assignment to the trustor,
his heirs or personal representatives, so as to invalidate any payment made by them, or any of them,
to the person holding the note, bond or other instrument evidencing the obligation by the trust deed.
1961

Chapter 2. Acknowledgements
57-2-1. Manner of acknowledging or proving
conveyances.
57-2-2. Who authorized to take acknowledgments.
57-2-3. Acknowledgment by deputy.
57-2-4. Taking acknowledgments of persons with United
States armed forces.
57-2-5. Certificate of acknowledgment.
57-2-6. Party must be known or identified.
57-2-7. Form of certificate of acknowledgment.
57-2-8. When grantor unknown to officer.
57-2-9. When executed by attorney in fact.
57-2-10. Proof of execution - How made.
57-2-11. Witness must be known or identified.
57-2-12. What must be proven.
57-2-13. Form of certificate.
57-2-14. When subscribing witness dead - Proof of
handwriting.
57-2-15. What evidence required.
57-2-16. Subpoena to subscribing witness.
57-2-17. Disobedience - Contempt • Proof aliunde.
57-2-1. Manner of acknowledging or proving
conveyances.
Every conveyance in writing whereby any real
estate is conveyed or may be affected shall be acknowledged or proved and certified in the manner
hereinafter provided.
1953
57-2-2. W h o authorized to take
acknowledgments.
The proof or acknowledgment of every conveyance whereby any real estate is conveyed or may be
affected shall be taken by one of the following officers:
(1) if acknowledged or proved within this state, by
(a) a judge or clerk of a court having a seal, (b) a
notary public, or (c) a county clerk or county recorder;
(2) if acknowledged or proved outside of this state
and within any state or territory of the United
States, by (a) a judge or clerk of any court of the
United States, or of any state or territory, having a
seal, (b) a notary public, or (c) a commissioner
appointed by the governor of this state for that
purpose;
(3) if acknowledged or proved outside of the
United States, by (a) a judge or clerk of any court
of any state, kingdom, or empire having a seal, (b)
any notary public of that state, kingdom, or empire,
or (c) any ambassador, minister, commissioner,
consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the
United States appointed to reside in that state,
kingdom, or empire.
19*7
57-2-3. Acknowledgment by deputy.
When any of the officers above mentioned are
authorized by law to appoint a deputy, such acknowledgment or proof may be taken by any such
deputy in the name of his principal.
1953
57-2-4. Taking acknowledgments of persons with
United States armed forces.
In addition to the acknowledgment of instruments
in the manner and form and as otherwise authorized
by this chapter, any person serving in or with the
armed forces of the United States may acknowledge
the same wherever located before any commissioned
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